> Free will in humans does not remove God's knowledge or power; and because He has perfect knowledge, we cannot stump him. We can't "make the decision He thinks we won't make" - because He knows what we're thinking.
>

No matter how many times I've run this through in my head over the years, I've never been able to make sense of it. Okay, let's suppose God does have perfect knowledge, including all future events and states of the universe. Now suppose the simple situation of a person (let's call him John) faced with two choices (A and B). Now God knows, well in advance (in fact, he always knew) what John would choose. Let's suppose, without loss of generality, that it's B. Then what does it mean to say that John has free will in this matter? To any other person in the universe, it might be the case that he could never predict with certainty what John would choose -- even in theory, knowing the exact physical state of the universe, all of its physical laws, etc. This includes John himself. The day before he makes his choice, he himself might not be able to know what he'll end up choosing. But still, no matter how much you try to get around it, you just can't deny that no matter what, John *had* to choose B, if only for the simple fact that God knew John would choose B and God has perfect knowledge.

One way out of this is to say that my concept of free will is off. If so, how should free will be defined in order to reconcile the problem? Perhaps the way I was sort of getting to before, that an action is of free will if it can not be perfectly foreseen by any entity *besides* God? If, all these years, I've misunderstood what "free will" means to most people, please by all means let me know.

Another way, perhaps is not to posit that God's perfect knowledge extends to future events, but I doubt many theists would choose that option.

Besides these, is there any other way out?