> On the other hand, it's also important not to *overestimate* the effect here. It is doubtful that even those who cannot bring themselves to chop up a robotic dog would find it *immoral* to do so, whereas most people would have a problem with people that go around chopping up actual dogs. Obviously no matter how realistic a robot dog is, and no matter how much the realism of a robot dog affects our emotional response to it, there still IS a difference in the way real and simulated life impact us, emotionally and morally.

Absolutely disagree. If the dog is indistinguishable from a real dog, then I would aruge it is every bit as "alive" -- in the ways that count -- as a real dog and is deserving of the same moral and legal considerations that a real dog would have. Actually, whether it's alive to me is a non-issue; what's important is whether the thing is intelligent. None but a few nutjobs accuse me of behaving immorally if I cut down a tree that I own, but I have unquestionably ended a life in that case. We don't give plants rights because they have no intelligence, not because they're not alive.

This is something I've thought a lot about, and I think that once we create sentient computer programs we will be obligated to vest in them the same rights as biological life forms of equivalent intelligence. This probably goes to the root of my guess as to what consciousness is, namely a very complicated mix of hardware and software, but in my mind creatures are defined by what they do, not how they were created.

Humans who are created by in vitro fertilization are not any less human than those of us created through more traditional means. It's not a great analogy, but it's the closest I can come with our current levels of technology. If we grant that we can create sufficiently complex simulations of lifeforms that they are indistinguishable from the real thing, then I believe something similar to the Turing test is a good measure of whether or not they should be considered as alive as the creatures they are replicating. I.e. if humans familiar with the original cannot tell the replicant from the real after significant interactions, then the replicant is as intelligent as the real one.

I don't think there is any good, objective way to figure out if something is intelligent or not. To me, that's the basis of having to behave morally toward something. I can feel free to smash up my printer with an axe because I'm positive that I'm not ending the existence of an intelligence. The robodog that is functionally equivalent to a real dog makes me much less certain.

Now, it may turn out that there is some way to objectively measure intelligence that we will not figure out until we understand how it is consciousness works. Given our current understanding, I'm more inclined to err on the side of caution.

Stephen