I can't help but say a few things about this. Too ... interesting ... must ... type.

I agree with much of what you say in this post, but there are a few things worth mentioning, I think.

>First, I disagree that science is a belief system in the same way that religion is a belief system. Science, as I use the term, makes no specific claims about reality, though heavily implied are the assumptions that an objective reality exists and humans are capable of learning about it through observation.

I think the claim "there exists an external reality" is more than merely implied; it is an essential assumption, at least, if the conclusions of the use of science mean anything at all. Discovering the underlying rules about our own private dream world might be a practical result of the scientific method, but it would be, ultimately, meaningless.

There is another assumption of this sort that are required by the scientific method to have meaning, namely, that the relation of cause to effect holds indefinitely. Like the claim that the external world exists, the claim that the cause-effect relation holds true is necessary for us to make any inferences about the future. As Hume pointed out, our observations and sense data about the world, and our memories, are only that, and do not tell us anything about what will happen unless the cause-effect relation holds. That the sun rose today is no guarantor that it will rise tomorrow, unless the continuity of experience holds.

Unfortunately, like the claim that the external world exists, the claim that the cause-effect relation holds is impossible to prove, and must be assumed. Reason cannot get us past this assumption (thus far). I say this only to point out that the scientific method, as useful as it is, contains within it assumptions that are as non-rational as some of the claims of religions or superstitions.

Furthermore, I think that Matthew might be getting at something, though it seems somewhat confused. While I agree with you that science is not itself a belief or belief system, it is true that people tend to form beliefs based on the results of science, or not, and call those beliefs "science". For many people, prefacing a contention with the words "Science shows" or "Science says" (whatever that means) is commonplace, and such beliefs often have the same character as religious or superstitious beliefs. This can happen especially with 'scientific' theories, which are really belief systems that purport to organize and explain the results of science. Many of these, not being science proper, are difficult to evaluate according to the scientific method because they are often broad, far-reaching, and removed from the phenomenon they are meant to explain or coordinate. At this level, the theory level, what is commonly called 'science' may be no more inherently reasonable or reasoned than the claims of astrologers. Usually they have a better basis, but not always, so it is worth keeping in mind.

> We are simply trying to isolate cause and effect and from that understand reality.

See:) Not being pedantic here, as I agree with you through most of the past section, and with this statement. But it is good to recognise that cause and effect is an assumption; we have used it for so long that it is easy to forget its assumptive character.

> > On the more sociological side of the post, people that are extreme in any belief are to be worried about. Anyone that attributes their entire life to astrology is frankly dangerous, but so are people that form extreme opinions on religion or those who can say that particle interactions mean there's no such thing as conscious decision-making.
>
> I'll agree with your general point, but allow me to be more specific: anybody who refuses to allow evidence to alter their previously-held notions is dangerous. This is the fundamental beauty of science: it encourages us to constantly re-evaluate our beliefs.

Eeep. I don't know how strong we should make this claim. I am supposing, of course, that you mean good evidence, that is, repeated and repeatable, and relevant observations. And that is as it should be.

There are, however, some realms where this is not always the case. As C.S. Lewis pointed out, constant reevaluation of our beliefs about persons might be entirely inappropriate. If my wife has promised to be faithful to our marriage, sexually and otherwise, and at some point I find that there is some, or even much, evidence that she has been unfaithful, I really would be a terrible person if I divorced her immediately. She might be innocent, in which case, time might tell, or perhaps I would need to trust her word alone. My wife may have been cheating on me. The relevant point is simply that between persons, the bounds of what is considered reasonable trust are significantly stretched, and it is often considered right and proper to trust even in the face of what 'seems' to be evidence of broken trust. This is what differentiates belief in God (in the judeo-christian sense) from coming to believe in God. In the former case, one has moved into a relationship very much like that with a person, and as such what one is willing to believe may go well beyond what would otherwise be irrational. When deciding whether God exists, however, one is in a quite different position, and the usual ruthlessness of the scientific method might be appropriate.
> Stephen

frum