Wow. You two wrote very impressively. I'm going to quote you in pieces and out of order, because it is easier that way.

>The terminology is all really vague and is different from what other people use. I don't think I really am disagreeing with you about the truth of various claims, just whether science should address them.
> --gremlinn

The nature of science is a gigantic topic. Volumes have been written on it, and it's a safe bet that no one here has come anywhere close to reading all of the material. Still, we don't need to be experts to examine what we already know and what we think we know.

Reading all of this thread, it really seemed like two different arguments, because, as gremlinn mentioned, the terminology is different. If each of you maintain your own set of definitions, then there can be no real agreement. So, I'll attempt to introduce some precision. I took the first definition from dictionary.com. It is not necessarily all there is to science, of course, but it matched this discussion perfectly.

"a. The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of phenomena.
b. Such activities restricted to a class of natural phenomena."

(Monkeyman) >... you have a body of data to be explained, and then you have a pool of live options or various explanations for that data. You need to choose which explanation from that pool would, if true, best explain the observed data.

(gremlinn) >It follows by my definitions of science and the 'natural' world that science deals with *exactly* all of the natural world, and nothing more, and thus the end result of a scientific inquiry can not have a supernatural explanation.

Monkeyman's definition of science was (a), while gremlinn's was (b). Each argued the various merits of his position.

The crux of Monkeyman's argument (and mine, too) is that there is no logical necessity to restrict science to definition (b). One certainly *can* choose it, but it must be acknowledged that this is a philosophical choice, not a scientific mandate or suggestion. The argument about "plausibility versus possibility" is the same issue in different words. Supernatural explanations are only considered second-class explanations if one has already committed to a naturalist philosophy.

Here's the definition I found for supernatural, and the one I will consistently use:
"Of or relating to existence outside the natural world."

> 'Supernatural' ... means not understandable by natural laws

Agreed, but it needs clarification. One might be able to naturally describe every aspect of a supernatural event except its cause. Sometimes, an event is simply *too* coincidental, bordering implausibly close to impossible; the supernatural could be a reasonable explanation in such a case, even though *all* aspects can be described naturalistically.

> When the formerly 'supernatural' becomes tied in with a larger ... body of knowledge, it becomes natural.

Your point is understood, but it is not an argument for naturalism. Science attempts to the find correct explanations (or those which best fit current data). It is far from uncommon or undesirable for scientists to alter an explanation or come up with a radically new one. It happens all the time, because new evidence sometimes points in different directions. If, perchance, evidence points to the natural, then the appropriate natural explanation is used until new evidence requires a revision. If evidence points to the supernatural, likewise. If an explanation that was formerly thought to be supernatural gains a natural basis, that is also perfectly acceptable.

That last sentence may sound overly simplistic. For example, it might be argued that, if an explanation assumes God exists, then he becomes part of the natural. However, God is by definition supernatural. If he exists, he exists outside of our natural framework and affects it from the outside. [Side note: Sometimes it is argued that existence includes only what naturalists consider natural. This fits their philosophy, but is not logically mandated or suggested.]

> To say such data leads to a supernatural explanation is to say that not only do we not have a natural explanation, but it is provable that no such natural explanation could exist. I'm not even sure such a proof would be possible.

I'll give an example. Say a person on death's edge, completely out of touch with what is happening in the room, starts responding to events that haven't happened yet and for which there is no normal way it could be known. [This is actually not uncommon.] Some possible explanations include strange mental abilities, inhumanly excellent intuition, alien interference, and a supernatural event. To me, the latter seems most likely. To a naturalist, perhaps the first would.

> I agree that something supernatural could be observed (though it wouldn't be necessarily provably supernatural).

To be too technical, nothing is ever proven in science.

I hope that wasn't too repetitive.
gabby