I'm not a clear writer, due in large part to my preference for brevity. I'm getting irritated, however, at how all the nonissues are getting picked at while the point is ignored. Therefore, I will attempt to write down every last iota that I think.

> > You're explaining synergy, which I understand. But each part must still contribute to the synergy: while it is more than the sum of its parts, it still has parts. The effect doesn't come from nothing at all.
> >
> Nobody said it did. What does ab initio (from scratch) thematics have to do with synergy?

Perhaps I'm the fool from King Arthur's court, but, "ye say so and in the same breath take it away again." All the replies did argue this. The words aren't exact matches of what I claimed, but they say the same thing. I'll explain in a moment. And I quote:

http://www.rinkworks.com/rinkforum/view.cgi?post=26593
>Because the whole item [like a human brain] has a certain property [of consciousness], you're asking whether the *individual parts* must also have that property. Restated, the generalized presupposition could appear to read in clearer terms,
>
> / / / / / Complex chemical interactions in SOME matter can create consciousness;
> / / / / / therefore, are the individual particles of ALL matter potentially residually 'aware' on some complex chemical level?
> The question implies: that there is no real difference between the properties of things which occupy opposite ends of a continuum -- from constituent parts going towards the whole object -- because it assumes there is no definable moment when one becomes the other. This assumption is not sustainable. In the example of the brain, the actions of many neurons, synapses, and neurotransmitters can have an overall powerful emergent effect which we could call 'consciousness'. When working individually, these neuronal brain processes are not that much different than nerve processes in the rest of your body. Working together, however, the whole is mysteriously greater than the sum of its parts.
>Wolfspirit

http://www.rinkworks.com/rinkforum/view.cgi?post=26445
>Some matter (for this argument, I'll use Carbon), when put through complex reactions (In this case, expremes of heat and presure), yeild diamond. Therefore, ALL matter must have some diamond.
>Kaz

http://www.rinkworks.com/rinkforum/view.cgi?post=26434
>It seems a bit like saying that since a pool of water is wet, each of the molecules must have a bit of wetness.
>gremlinn

http://www.rinkworks.com/rinkforum/view.cgi?post=26447
>As a better example, the sharpness of a knife blade is not in any sense reflected in its constituent parts. The configuration of the parts is what results in this macroscopic property. What I'm trying to say is that it's a logical misstep to assume that if consciousness is a property of a certain piece of matter, then the consciousness (necessary for self-awareness?) must reside in the parts (molecules, presumably) which make up the whole. The configuration and interrelationship of the parts must also be considered.
>gremlinn

There are only three options possible for division of a property.

1) It breaks down equally.
2) It doesn't break down at all.
3) Somewhere in between 1 and 2.

In my posts, I argued for position 3. This is the point I was making, the one I wanted responses to, and the one no one replied to. I'm *not* saying each molecule of water must feel wet. I'm *not* saying each atom in a knife must feel sharp. These are missing the point entirely, especially by using abstract concepts as examples.

All the responses acknowledged the existence only of positions 1 and 2, and since 1 is obviously false, they stood for position 2. If the particles don't contribute to the phenomenon (as was clearly argued in the replies), and *no unknown principles are invoked* (a criteria forgotten in the synergy explanation), then we are left with the phenomenon coming from _nothing_.

I accept "We don't know" as a valid answer. I do not accept, "We know, because we can explain it by unknown forces at work," which is fundamentally the same as "We know, because we don't know." That doesn't make any sense to me.

It doesn't have to be all or nothing. A refrigerator magnet can be magnetic without each particle in it being so. The rubber doesn't contribute, but something else does. Likewise, in the paint example, not every particle must be purple. In fact, none of them are, but the total effect is taken as purple. [More on this later.] In the same fashion, consciousness doesn't need to be broken down so that each molecule in the brain is conscious of its own puny existence. It may be that only certain molecules are, but remember that all molecules are formed from the same elements, and all elements are formed from the same subatomic particles. It may even be that only certain subatomic particles have the building blocks of consciousness. The other possibility for being 'tween option 1 and 2 also applies: not each particle must contribute the same aspect. We know what paint is made of, but we don't know entirely what the self we experience is formed from. So it is entirely possible, perhaps probable, that different types of matter would contribute different aspects of awareness.

__Hypothetical situation; don't take it too seriously.__
_Plus, I don't know much about the brain operation (I'm a highschool student)._
Say, for instance, that animal consciousness in all its glory is effected through a certain pattern of synaptic relay. What takes place in this pattern? Transfer of electrons, energy, and chemicals. So our several options (either exclusive or in cooperation) for the cause of consciousness are: the motion of said particles or certain types thereof; or, the particles themselves. First, since these particles exist in nature in abundance without creating sentience, (To our knowledge. If dirt is conscious, it hasn't got a way to receive stimuli or respond, so we wouldn't know. Occam's Razor applies here.) then the effect is probably generated by the motion of these particles, perhaps in collusion with the types. Second, all matter can move and not necessarily produce consciousness (with the same proviso). Therefore, it would seem that it is most likely certain particles moving in specific patterns that create full consciousness. However, we know from Einstein that all frames of reference are equally valid. So if motion is a cause of consciousness, acceleration is the only way a new effect may become involved, and not just motion. On the subatomic level, changing energy states (as a cause/effect of motion) also must be allowed as a possible contributor. Now here's the crux: any principle that contributes toward consciousness--whether or not it is as sentient as ourselves--is plainly not fully understood. Such a principle is _exactly_ what I meant when I stated that non-sentient matter might have an "infinitesimal awareness."

When I wrote the original question for the forum, I chose this small gap in logic thinking that anyone could fill it in with common sense because I felt it made the question less cluttered. I only briefly considered that people may argue that it was a reduction fallacy. (I knew the concept though not the name.) I see now that I should have left that part in. I'd still like some answers to the question.

> I guess the reason why everyone answered you the way we did is that you're *still* reframing the question continually in terms of the Reductionist approach.

I'm not, and this is what is peeving me.

>For example, take your analogy about colourless particles (and they are, in fact, colourless on the subatomic scale) and how they combine together on a higher macroscopic scale to absorb visible wavelengths resulting in the colour which we call 'purple.' This is a purely reductionist problem and the answer to it is well known -- in terms of what happens when a wavelength hits the retina and it is absorbed by cone cells, resulting in a signal-transduction event sent to the visual cortex, etc.

This particular argument is based entirely on semantics. Read Den-Kara's thread about the tree-falling-in-a-forest question, and especially [Spacebar]'s answer to it. You are saying something is only a color if it is experienced by someone. I was using 'color' as the 'frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum of the photons emitted by excited atoms,' if you wish a more technical explanation than simply 'color.'
http://www.rinkworks.com/rinkforum/view.cgi?post=26735

As for the 'sharpness of a knife' property, the real property under consideration is shape, or even more basally, taking up space, which is a defining characteristic of matter. I hope I don't need to explain that more. As gremlinn noted, liquidity can be inferred from the characteristics of the molecule and the environment.

> Crick and Koch

Heh.

> WHY NEUROSCIENCE MAY BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN CONSCIOUSNESS
> by Francis Crick and Christof Koch

It was very interesting. Thank you, Wolf. Just one question... You didn't actually type it all, did you? I mean, you copied-and-pasted it from the internet and didn't spend hours of effort here, right?

> As we see it, the hard problem can be broken down into several questions: Why do we experience anything at all? What leads to a particular conscious experience (such as the blueness of blue)? Why are some aspects of subjective experience impossible to convey to other people (in other words, why are they private [such as pain or pleasure])?

The idea isn't much interested in memory and regulatory functions of the brain. It is mostly concerned with what this information is being relayed to.

> (***) Physicist John A. Wheeler's suggestion that Information is fundamental to the physics of the universe. The laws of physics might ultimately be cast in informational terms, in which case we would have a satisfying congruence between the [neural correlate] constructs in both physical and psychophysical laws. It may even be that a theory of physics and a theory of consciousness could eventually be consolidated into a single grander theory of information.
>
> A potential problem is posed by the ubiquity of information. Even a thermostat embodies some information, for example, but is it conscious? There are at least two possible responses. First, we could constrain the fundamental laws so that only some information has an experiential aspect, perhaps depending on how it is physically processed. Second, we might bite the bullet and allow that all information has an experiential aspect - where there is complex information processing, there is complex experience, and where there is simple information processing, there is simple experience. If this is so, then even a thermostat might have experiences, although they would be much simpler than even a basic color experience, and there would certainly be no accompanying emotions or thoughts. This seems odd at first, but if experience is truly fundamental, we might expect it to be widespread. [...]

Precisely the idea that I've been explaining!

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I've tried my best, and I won't try again.

gab"didn't see this post for a few days because of the changed subject"by