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> > > If consciousness can be effected through complex reactions of matter, all matter must be at least infinitesimally self-aware.
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> > I don't follow the logic of this step. It seems a bit like saying that since a pool of water is wet, each of the molecules must have a bit of wetness. This is similar to the fallacy of composition, by which one assumes that if a property is held by the constituents of an object, then it must also be held by the object itself. Maybe this could be called the "fallacy of decomposition," since you're saying that a property held by an object must be held at least partly by each of its pieces.
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> I don't follow the example. Could you explain it in more detail? Each molecule of water does possess the qualities which we interpret, en masse, as wetness/liquidity.

The property of liquidity really only makes sense on a macroscopic scale, when we observe how freely the molecules can move relative to one another. Although I suppose the fact that it's a liquid can be deduced from examining the chemical structure and knowing how much energy there is, etc.

As a better example, the sharpness of a knife blade is not in any sense reflected in its constituent parts. The configuration of the parts is what results in this macroscopic property. What I'm trying to say is that it's a logical misstep to assume that if consciousness is a property of a certain piece of matter, then the consciousness (necessary for self-awareness?) must reside in the parts (molecules, presumably) which make up the whole. The configuration and interrelationship of the parts must also be considered.

-- gremlinn